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Introduction 
 
Israeli politics has undergone radical changes as a result of both 
geopolitical contingencies (i.e. the uncertainty regarding the Two-States’ 
solution) and domestic developments (e.g. political reforms, social welfare, 
ethno-social cleavages etc.). These have influenced Israel’s “state of mind”, a 
concept, as vague as it may initially seem, that is far from being novel in either 
daily or psychological discourse; yet relatively unexplored in political studies. It 
has been mostly used in constructivist theory as a disposition, produced by 
opinion\preference formation and socialization; a result of skill developing and 
political learning, which consists of sensitivity, concern enabling the 
perception\rating of issues and the targeted identification of problems. In my 
reading, a “state of mind” is a corpus, a substructure of intangible, but 
nonetheless indispensable, mental pictures through which reality is perceived 
and constructed1.As such, similar to the concept of identity2, the former features 
an emphasis on ideas, culture and values. Thus it is useful in tracing both 
patterns of causality over a period of time and in changing social circumstances, 
as well as conceptualizing individual self-definition alongside socially related 
cognitive endeavors3.  
                                                 
1
  See Charles E. Lindblom, “Another State of Mind”, The American Political Science 
Review, vol. 76, no. 1, 1982, pp. 9-21; John E. Rielly, “America’s State of Mind”, 
Foreign Policy, vol. 66, 1987, pp. 39-56; Roger Morgan, “A European ‘Society of States’ 
‒ but only States of Mind?”, International Affairs, vol. 76, no. 3, 2000, pp. 559-574.  
2
  Since the definitional plurality of ‘identity’ is oceanic, we approach the concept as an 
interactive and dynamic product originated by the formulation and recognition (both 
individually and collectively) of a shared sense of belonging. See A. Touraine, “An 
Introduction to the Study of Social Movements”, Social Research, vol. 52, no. 4, “Social 
Movements”, Winter 1985, pp. 749-787; A. Melucci, “Nomads of the Present ‒ Social 
Movements and Individual Needs”, in John Keane, Paul Mier (eds.), Contemporary 
Society, Temple University, Philadelphia, 1989, pp. 180-232; Cristina Flesher Fominaya, 
“Collective Identity in Social Movements: Central Concepts and Debates”, Sociology 
Compass, vol. 4, no.6, 2010, pp. 393-404. 
3
  See E. Gellner, Culture, Identity, and Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
New York, 1987. 
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Based on the above, the main research question is: How the concept of 
“state of mind” can be used with regard to Israeli politics? Beyond the 
synthetic theoretical delimitations mentioned above, this paper assumes that it is 
possible to refer to the concept of “state of mind” as a container delineating the 
erosion of some traditional issues (e.g. security and peace, secular-religious 
status quo) and the revival of others (e.g. social equity, ethic cleavages) in the 
arena of the most recent legislative Israeli elections. Furthermore, in this 
reading, the concept reflects, to some extent, the identity of the main political 
actors, whether individually or collectively. Whereas a “state of mind” presents 
transient features (in terms of either emotions or content), an “identity” 
comprises more solid and structured elements (cultural traditions and normative 
practices) which are more easily recognizable at a social level4. However, while 
the latter is tangible with difficulty beyond the observable actions deriving from 
it, the former is more easily contextualized in time and space; a sort of segment 
of the larger institutionalized and politicised national identity5. Before 
proceeding with the argument, a caveat  is necessary. Dealing with Israeli 
politics through the lenses of identity and state of mind is an oceanic field of 
interrogation. It is hence necessary to limit the focus on three main aspects: 1) 
political discourse and legitimacy; 2) the perception of Israel’s national and 
social security; 3) antagonistic leadership Their choice is far from being 
arbitrary; the three aspects have become key-elements in Israeli politics since 
the country gained independence in 1948. Moreover, as Israeli democracy has 
been continuously challenged by both foreign and domestic difficulties (e.g. 
war, social unrest, ideological polarization), these three aspects need to be 
collocated within a bigger picture: Israeli politics. Such a deductive step is 
particularly useful considering the intricate Israeli sociopolitical history as well 
as of the wide range of politics itself. Elections may also serve as a magnifying 
glass of what and how citizenry perceives and articulates democratic politics; 
much beyond the more traditional definition of the former as an aggregation of 
interests entailed by democratic representation6. In a constructivist frame of 
interpretation, it is hence possible to describe elections as institutions that aim 
both to validate and negotiate the existent power relations between the 
governing and the governed. Consequence of a simple syllogism, it is possible 
to assert that if Israel is a democracy and if elections are essential moments in a 
democratic setting, then the political institutions of popular vote and the 
(s)election of a legitimated ruling-class are highly relevant issue that require 
focused investigations. 
                                                 
4
  The complexity of “state of mind” is similar to that of “populism”. See M. Tarchi, L'Italia 
populista: Dal qualunquismo a Beppe Grillo, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2015. 
5
  See R. Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the 
New Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: New York [etc.], 1996.  
6
  We refer to the traditional and procedural interpretation: “[A]n election is a device for 
filling public offices by reference to popular preferences”, see A. Heywood, Political 
Theory: An Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 235. 
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The main contribution of the proposed analysis is to specify the key-
elements in Israel’s political discourse (i.e. leadership, security and legitimacy) 
as a part of multi-factorial trends such as the ongoing fragmentation and 
sectorialization of political offer, the increasingly clashes in political 
antagonism, the conflict within Israeli citizenry and the sociopolitical cleavages 
it eternalizes. By using the venue of legislative elections, as a moment to 
observe and deconstruct the Israeli “state of mind”, not only can we delineate 
and contextualize current dynamics in Israeli political culture but we can also 
trace the evolving structural features of Israeli democracy (e.g. key-actors, 
decision-making, ideological content). 
 
 
Case Selection and Theoretical Expectations 
 
Israeli politics is not new to political analysts. Neither is Israeli politics. 
Many papers and books have been written about the history and variations of 
Zionism and its leaders as a core-element of Israeli party-politics and their role 
in shaping Israeli national identity7. Furthermore, literature has been generous 
and enlightening in examining the geopolitical conflict with the Arab world and 
Israeli policies without omitting the increasing more relevant heuristic salience 
of leadership. Neither there exist a lack of scientific reviews concerning the 
divergent politico-cultural profiles of Ashkenazi and Sephardi Israelis (the so-
called “ethnic cleavage”) nor scholarly production about Israel’s ethnic and 
religious minorities8. In addition, wider political phenomena such as the rise of 
radical right parties and the issues of coalition-building in Israel have not been 
neglected9. Thus, various topics as statehood, nation-building, ideology etc. 
                                                 
7
  See Y. Shavit, Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement, 1925-1948, Frank Cass & Co. 
LTD, Abingdon (Oxon, UK), New York (USA), 1988; Z. Sterhell, The Founding Myths of 
Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, transl. by D. Maisel, 
Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1998; A. Shapira, Essential Papers on Zionism, 
ed. with Jehuda Reinharz, New York University Press, New York, 1996, as well as Idem, 
Ben-Gurion: Father of Modern Israel, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 
2014; D. Gordis, Menachem Begin and the Battle for Israel’s Soul, Schoken 
Books/Nextbook Press, New York, 2014. 
8
  See Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Society, and the 
Military, University of California Press, Berkley, Los-Angeles and London, 2001; 
Yehuda Goodman, Joseph Loss, “The Other as Brother: Nation-Building and Ethnic 
Ambivalence in Early Jewish-Israeli Anthropology”, Anthropological Quarterly, vol. 82, no. 2, 
Spring, 2009, pp. 477-508; Avi Bareli, “Mapai and the Oriental Jewish Question in the 
Early Years of the State”, Jewish Social Studies: History, Culture, Society, n.s. 16, no. 1, 
Fall 2009, pp. 54-84; As’ad Ghanem, Ethnic Politics in Israel: The Margins and the 
Ashkenazi Center, Routledge, Abingdon, New York, 2010.  
9
  See E. Sprinzak, “The Emergence of the Israeli Radical Right”, Comparative Politics, 
vol. 21, no. 2, 1989, pp. 171-192; followed by his book The Ascendance of Israel’s 
Radical Right, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1991; D. Filc, U. Lebel, 
“The Post-Oslo Israeli Populist Radical Right in Comparative Perspective: Leadership, 
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have been thoroughly analysed, while providing evidence that Israel, despite 
geopolitical and cultural  specificities, can be studied by using more general, 
Western, political concepts. Yet, when it comes to parliamentary elections, 
relatively little has been examined beyond the descriptive and punctual 
overview of the results10 notwithstanding the use of different approaches11. That 
is not to say that media coverage suffices or completes what may or may not be 
traced from an electoral event. It does not mean that studying Israel’s electoral 
trends does not deserve attention. However, it means there is a void to fill in by 
complementary analysis of elections as a moment in which Israel’s “state of 
mind” reveals its shades rather than being the direct reflection of the former and 
automatically dichotomized between Israeli Right and Left. As a result, the 
paper wishes to delineate the constellation of political factors through an 
identity-based analysis rather than to focus on the results of the democratic 
practice. As identity is multifaceted, the paper’s point of departure draws on 
recent lessons concerning populistic elements and its place in western 
democracies (i.e. leadership, charisma, the people\not-people dichotomy) and 
the connected political communication subject-matters (issue-setting). It seeks 
to offer a new way of looking at elections, not as a simple outcome of political 
maneuvering but as one which embodies deeper and longer dynamics regarding 
national identity and what politicians make of it. In other words, elections may 
provide us the opportunity to detect the intensification of political antagonism 
in search of visibility and consensus, the capitalization of existent cleavages in 
Israeli society, as well as the re-adaptation of issues. But before we examine 
those political factors point by point, we must recapitulate the event itself. 
 
 
Engraving Politics in 2015 Israel  
 
The Israeli electoral system is based on proportional representation as 
formulated by the Hagenbach-Bischoff model. The whole national territory serves as 
a single electoral constituency in which 120 Knesset-members are elected 
                                                                                                                       
Voter Characteristics and Political Discourse”, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 10, no. 1, 
2005, pp. 85-97.   
10
  We mainly refer to the sector of electoral studies tout court as offered by Israeli scholars. 
See Abraham Diskin, Reuven Y. Hazan, “The Parliamentary Election in Israel, January 
2013”, in Notes on Recent Elections, “Electoral Studies”, vol. 34, 2014, pp. 291-379 
11
  It is noteworthy to mention the socio-spatial approach offered by two Israeli geographers 
who have studied political partisanship as reflected from the electoral results. See 
I. Charney, D. Malkinson, “Between Electoral and Urban Geography: Voting Patterns and 
Socio-Spatial Dynamics in Tel-Aviv”, Applied Geography, vol. 58, 2015, pp. 1-6; as well 
as the more historical\sociological approach of Alexander Bligh in studying vote patterns 
in the Israeli Arab population. See A. Bligh, “Political Trends in the Israeli Arab 
Population and its Vote in Parliamentary Elections”, Israel Affairs, vol. 19, no. 1, 2013, 
pp. 201-219. 
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(based on a closed-list system). Since Israeli democracy represents a wide and 
fragmented factions composing Israeli citizenry, ‒ Jewish and non-Jewish, lay and 
religious along the entire dichotomous spectrum of Left and Right ‒, the party system 
consists of a plurality of political parties addressing issues from different ideological 
worldviews. Consequently, the Israeli multi-party system12 results in political 
alliances between different political actors, which favours the formation of political 
blocs and thus determines political offer. 
The table below summarizes the essential figures included in our 
analysis. It emphasizes Israeli parties and the centrality of their leaders as well 
as the fragmentation of the Israeli political offer13 while assessing the 
continuity\discontinuity with the previous electoral round. The total Israeli 
suffrage comprised 5,881,696 voters from which only 4,254,738 individuals 
went to the ballot. 4,210,884 votes were qualified as legally valid (thus:  43,854  
disqualified or 1.03%). The voter turnout reached 72.34% (against 67.8% in the 
2013 legislative elections); the highest rate since 1999 (78.7%). The legal 
threshold was 3.25% (or the number of 136,854 valid votes). 
 
Table 1 
Elections for the 20th Knesset 17 March 2015 
Parties elected to 
Knesset Party Leader % Votes 
No. 
Seats 
Trend 
Compared 
to 2013 
Legislative 
Elections 
Likud Benjamin Netanyahu 23.40% 30 +12 
Zionist Union Isaac Herzog  (Labour Party) Tzipi Livini (Hatnuah) 18.67% 24 +3 
Joint List Ayman Odeh 10.54% 13 +2 
Yesh Atid Yair Lapid 8.81% 11 -8 
Kulanu Moshe Kahlon 7.49% 10 New 
The Jewish Home Naftali Bennett 6.74% 8 -4 
Shas  Aryeh Deri 5.73% 7 -4 
Yisrael Beitenu Avigor Lieberman 5.11% 6 -7 
United Torah 
Judaism Yaakov Litzman 5.03% 6 -1 
Meretz  Zehava Gal-On 3.93% 5 -1 
Source: Israeli Central Elections Committee 2015. 
 
                                                 
12
  In the 2013 legislative elections 120 members of Knesset (MKs) were elected from 12 
parties, whereas in the 2015 elected Knesset 10 parties are represented. On the so-called 
“sectorial parties” and current political alliances, see below. 
13  The table only comprises the winning parties of the 2015 legislative elections. However it 
is important to mention that other 15 electoral lists had registered at the Israeli Central 
Elections Committee 2015 prior to the campaign. These lists gained approx. 190,000 votes 
(circa 4.5% of the total amount) and did not surpass the legal threshold. 
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The Institutional Context of the 2015 Elections:  
Reasons and Main Actors 
 
On 8 December 2014, the 19th Knesset passed a bill to dissolve itself 
and hold elections on 17 January 2015, after the tumultuous ending of Prime 
Minister Netanyahu third government. This vote followed increasing difficulties 
in compacting coalition lines over ideology and policy-making14. One of the 
issues concerned a significant structural element in the Israeli political system: 
the electoral threshold. Its change in March 2014 (from 2% to 3.25%) has been 
a matter of both legal and political disputes. The latter was mainly endorsed by 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Avigdor Lieberman and his party “Israel Our 
Home” (Yisrael Beiteinu), implying that reduced number of (small) parties 
secures better governability and encourages effective political mergers15. 
However, alternative explanations for the amendment may be found. In addition 
to the assumption that lasting governments are unlikely in a highly fragmented 
political party-system, the “Governance Bill” aimed at shrinking the political 
weight of Netanyahu’s (at the time) opponents from the two poles of Israel’s 
political spectrum. In other words, it targeted for a less multipolar 
representation in the Israeli Parliament starting from the so-called “sectorial 
parties”: the Arab parties16 and the ultra-Orthodox ones (vis-à-vis the so-called 
“consensual” ones). While the first are “uncomfortably” anti-Zionist, the second 
have been controversial in demanding considerable parts of the government 
budget to be destined to their own communities. It is unnecessary to mention 
that the two different political groups heavily criticized the “undemocratic” 
move. The Knesset voting took place on 11 March 2014 with 67 votes in favour 
of the new Electoral Law (endorsed by the entire governing coalition), while the 
opposition jointly boycotted it17. But the “straw that broke the camel’s back” 
was no other than the controversial Basic Law proposal: Israel as the Nation-
State of the Jewish People; firstly submitted by Knesset Members Avi Dichter 
                                                 
14
  We refer to the wave of resignations within the 33th Israeli government starting from 
Minister of Internal Affairs Gideon Sa’ar (Likud) on 4 November 2014 and ending with 
the dismissals from office of Justice Minister Tzipi Livni and Finance Minister Yair Lapid 
on 2 December 2014. All these affected the power-balance of several Israeli parties.  
15
  The dynamics of the “Governance Bill” are journalistically summarized in the following 
articles: http://www.timesofisrael.com/governance-bill-is-a-game-changer-for-israeli-politics/ 
(English), (last accessed 11 July 2017); http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/1.2083301 
(Hebrew), (last accessed 11 July 2017); http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politi/1.2086308 
(Hebrew), (last accessed 11 July 2017). 
16
  A. Bligh, “Political Trends in the Israeli Arab Population...cit”. Also see footnote no. 11 
17
  The amendment (n. 62 of the Israeli Electoral Law) was officially published on 19.3.2014. 
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(Kadima)18 and Ze’ev Elkin (Likud) in August 2011 and unsuccessfully 
archived at the time. However, a similar draft law was reformulated in March 
2013 after the issue became a part of the 19th Knesset negotiations, between the 
Likud-Yisrael Beitenu and The Jewish Home to form a new government headed 
by Benjamin Netanyahu. Several complementary proposals followed. The so-
called “Nation-State Law” bill defines several identity-building\conservation 
principles for contemporary Israel to follow. On the one hand, it reads that the 
State of Israel must be legally identified as the “nation state of the Jewish 
people”, and anchored to the ancient Jewish Torah Laws (mentioned as the 
“source of inspiration” for Israeli Civic Law, and so on, and so forth). 
Moreover, it establishes the Hebrew language as the sole official language in 
Israel, in contrast to the existing legal status quo (that has existed in Israel ever 
since its birth), which considered both Hebrew and Arabic to be official 
languages on an equal footing. Hence, it denotes Israeliness and Jewishness as 
one inseparable cultural stratum. On the other hand, the law proposal 
prescriptively privileges the acquisition of Israeli citizenship by every Jew 
living in Diaspora (paragraph 5). Thus, it further formalizes the State’s 
commitment to Jewish settlement. This point would not result so draconian, if it 
did not juxtapose the precarious legal status of non-Jews in today’s Israel. Many 
Arabs, whose forefathers have been living within the State’s geographical borders 
from days immemorial, have witnessed legal means being used to restrict their 
right to acquire private lands in Jewish communities. The move itself added oil to 
the political fire and shook the ground under Jewish and Arab feet. 
Furthermore, this ideological U-turn from liberal discourse by the 
rightist coalition silenced what many considered to be the progressist peace-
seeking legacy of the Oslo Accords. Although the bill did not pass and reflects 
only partially the broader sections of Israeli Jewish society, the mere necessity 
to theorize and adopt such basic-law implies far-reaching consequences. Not 
only has the deterioration of Jewish-Arab relations emphasized the almost 
insoluble tension regarding Arab citizens’ solidarity with their Palestinian kin in 
the Occupied Territories and throughout the Arab World (wars considered), but 
it has now reached the “self-fulfilling prophecy” about the presumed disloyalty 
of Israeli Arabs. This potential time-bomb, according to the rightist discourse, 
reached its climax when instead of the elder generation of Israeli Arabs, ‒ rather 
politically submissive and traditionally divided in four different political parties 
(Balad, Hadash, Ta’al and the United Arab List) −, a younger generation stood 
up for its rights, jointly struggling for equality with self-consciousness and 
                                                 
18
  In August 2012 Avi Dichter announced his resignation from the Knesset. He later joined 
the ranks of the Likud but failed to be elected for the party’s list for the 19th Knesset; however, 
the endeavour was accomplished in the Likud’s list for the 20th Knesset. 
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political shrewdness19. This is how the prevalently Arab Joint List came into 
being20. 
But what kind of discourse do we talk about, beyond the confrontation 
of conflicting political stances? Our scope conditions delineate the important 
role played by identity politics in Israel with regard to the country’s self-image 
as a Jewish state (vis-à-vis the Arab population) and its use in choosing criteria 
of governability as well as being omnipresent in the political playground of 
legislation and parties’ alliances. That is to say that Israeli politics, thus 
elections, are both characterized by discourse continuity taking advantage of the 
difficulty to define and interpret national identity in contemporary Israel. 
Nonetheless, this hypothesis does not exclude divergent modes to gain political 
consensus, as the prioritisation of issues not only shifts according to general 
social and cultural phenomena but affects politicians’ own offer vis-à-vis the 
electorate. 
The next paragraph aims to provide some general notions regarding 
legality and legitimacy as structured in Israeli politics. The two elements 
together with the issues of security and leadership (discussed below) take on 
new forms through time and socio-political change. Therefore, they can be used 
as four analytical variables representing contextual circumstances within Israeli 
politics while drawing the outlines of the country’s “state of mind”. 
 But what did precede the legislative elections in Israel 2015? What 
political calculations and maneuvering brought about the premature return to the 
ballot-box after the dissolution of the 2013-elected Knesset? The following 
paragraphs supply an overview of the political dynamics which provided the 
causes of the 2015 electoral event.  
 
 
The Three Dimensions of the Israeli “State of Mind” 
throughout the 2015 Elections 
 
Discourse and Legitimacy 
 
The electoral campaign for the 20th Knesset presented some noteworthy 
challenges to Israeli political discourse. It came after a short-lived government 
                                                 
19
  See once again Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness…cit. 
20
  The birth of the Joint List was widely reported by both Israeli and foreign media. See 
Ruth Eglash, “Israel's Arab Political Parties Have United for the First Time”, The 
Washington Post, 10 March 2015 (retrieved 22 September 2015); Hassan Shaalan, “Arab 
Parties to Run as One List in Upcoming Elections”, Ynet News, 22 January 2015 
(retrieved 22 September 2015); Elhanan Miller, “After Uniting Arabs Behind Him, 
Ayman Odeh Looks to Lead Opposition”, 4 March 2015, The Times of Israel (English): 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/after-uniting-arabs-behind-him-ayman-odeh-looks-to-lead-
opposition, (last accessed 11 July 2017).   
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that ran the 2014 summer Israel-Gaza conflict (also known as Operation 
Protective Edge) and should have given practical responses to the unresolved 
domestic issues of the 2011 Israeli social justice protests. While national 
security vis-à-vis welfare-related security will be discussed shortly, this 
paragraph aims at tracking down what some experts refer to as legalistic 
discourse in nowadays Israel: 
 
 “[…] the language and practices-about state law has been in some decline in Israeli 
society and it might be the case in other countries as well, since it has failed to provide 
path breaking social reforms”21 
 
The latter has traditionally played an important part in Israeli society and 
a useful tool for understanding the “Israeli People’s Army Model”, pursuing to 
implement the Jewish “melting pot” policy. The combination of civil duty and 
legalistic discourse continue to legitimize: 
 
“massive state interference in social and political life during security crises. Inter alia, 
the political establishment imposes compulsory recruitment of people and economic 
resources, controls information, and curtails individual freedoms of expression, 
association, and demonstration. The state promotes the emergence of exacting sociopolitical 
and legal norms and endorses severe sanctions against the opponents of war”22 
 
But no comparable institutionalized “civilian welfare” has yet stood 
against this hard-power “civilian militarism”23 maintaining the Israeli “liberal 
ethnocracy”24 Social issues were not forged into such a frame. According to 
Kimmerling (2001), that’s what keeps marginalising and counterbalancing 
(previously existing) values of pluralism, while forming a routinized “military-
cultural complex” 25. Therefore, and only to a marginal extent, the 2011 wave of 
social protests26 had induced social-led legalistic discourse to Israeli politics. 
                                                 
21
  See Shulamit Almog, Gad Barzilai, Social Protest and the Absence of Legalistic 
Discourse: In the Quest for New Language of Dissent, Springer Science+Business Media, 
Dordrecht, 2014: author’s personal copy (italics are mine). 
22
  Gad Barzilai, “War, Democracy, and Internal Conflict: Israel in a Comparative 
Perspective”, Comparative Politics, vol. 31, no. 3, Apr. 1999, pp. 317-336 (citation taken 
from p. 318). 
23
  Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Culture and Military 
in Israel, University of California Press, Los Angeles and Berkeley, 2001, pp. 208-209.   
24
  Shlomo Sand, The Invention of the Jewish People, Verso, London, New York, 2009, p. 307. 
25
 
  Baruch Kimmerling, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness…cit., pp. 208-228. 
26
  By “wave of social protests” we mean the series of demonstrations against the continuing 
rise of living costs in Israel. The first protest (June 2011) concerned food prices starting 
from a Facebook-led Israeli consumer boycott of cottage cheese (which is perceived as a 
basic national food commodity). The “Cottage Cheese Boycott” preceded more general 
protests (14 July 2011-29 October 2011) regarding the housing crisis and the increasing 
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However, an attempt to revive such a discourse did take form in the last 
electoral campaign. Disillusionment, skepticism and democratic malaise 
towards the state and self-absorbed politicians are only some of the buzzwords 
used to define common sentiments of restless citizenry. The cries and shouts of 
the weak and forgotten are evolving into an overwhelming social phenomenon. 
The explosion of complex anti-politics rhetoric often labelled as demagoguery 
and\or (neo)populism27, has paved the way for new poetic system channeling 
people’s boiling discontent into unapologetic tones. Of course, this has 
important implications for democracy-stakeholders (voters and representatives 
alike) as political trajectories make rethink political agendas and dynamically 
influence specific policies28. By filtering old and new interests in politics’ own 
recursive process, political figures corral and orchestrate the public in times of 
uncertainty and distrust. Such tendencies are observed in many western 
democracies, where decreasing economic growth and increasing political 
instability have been mostly felt. According to contemporary theories regarding 
populism, the loud critique coming from the people is no other than a 
sophisticated “populist antiestablishment strategy” promoted by mostly radical-
right parties that “present themselves as the real champions of true democracy ‒ 
as a new kind of party ‒ which takes the worries and interests of the common 
man into account”29. Thus antisystem discourse, including anti-elite echoes, is 
not unknown to mature democracies. And Israel is no different. Once the main 
claims of the last social protest were institutionalized and transformed into 
technocratic committees30 of experts and into administrative legal jargon, it 
seemed the political fervour had less public fortune, though not insignificant. 
We find suitable to mention the cases of Stav Shaffir and Itzik Shmuli: two 
leading protesters who had been actively involved in the social causes prior to 
the protests, came into the arena of party-politics by joining the ranks of the 
Labour Party in 2012, and were eventually elected to the Knesset in 2013. 
Despite the social buzz surrounding the two (chiefly due to their young age), 
their post-manifestation experiences only demonstrate the prevalence of 
                                                                                                                       
poverty rates. The latter are known by several names: “Social Justice Protest”, “Cost of 
Living Protest”, “Tents Protest”, or simply the “Middle Class Protest”. 
27
  See N. Bobbio, N. Matteucci, G. Pasquino (ed. by), Dizionario di Politica, UTET, Torino, 
2004. 
28
  For a case of politically neo-populist maneuvering, see Michael C. Campbell, “Are All 
Politics Local? A Case Study of Local Conditions in a Period of ‘Law and Order’ 
Politics”, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 664, 
no. 1, 2016, pp. 43-61. 
29
  See J. Rydgren, “The Sociology of the Radical Right”, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 33, 
2007, pp. 241-262 (citation taken from p. 246). 
30
  The major Social-Economic Change Committee, also known as the Trajtenberg 
Committee, gave birth to the political candidacy of the person heading it; Prof. Manual 
Trajtenberg who was elected as the 11th Knesset Member of the Zionist Union. 
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traditional political participation in the Israeli context. But still, and although 
the vocally disconcerting rallies of protesters gradually faded out, many social 
justice promises remained on paper alone. Hence, the momentum for social 
sensibility did not diminish, especially as a result of Netanyahu’s market-
oriented economic policies. Nevertheless, no external (a)political leading figure 
had been found till an ex-political actor came forth and proposed himself as the 
voice of the Israeli low-middle class. The buds of the Israeli 2011 social protest 
unfolded in the somewhat grey figure of Moshe Kahlon31 who waved the flag of 
social equality and anti-capitalism against the “fat and greedy” tycoons 
(supported by the financial establishment) on top of all ideological 
disagreements. Kahlon’s discourse offered something roughly similar to the 
traditional legalistic, rarely sensational, discourse regarding the certainty of law 
and norms and the imperative to adopt solidarity-based welfare policies. By 
avoiding harsh rhetorical statements as well as the traditional Right-Left 
dichotomy throughout the electoral campaign, but with “freestyled” slogans 
emphasising his real “Likudnik” profile towards the end of it, Moshe Kahlon 
and his party Kulanu (lit. “All of Us”) earned 10 seats in the Knesset (the fifth-
largest party), after obtaining 315,202 votes, or 7.49% of the total votes cast. 
Thus, Kahlon became a decisive figure, able to tip the balance of power in 
forming Netanyahu’s new Centre-Right coalition32. 
But did Moshe Kahlon’s political endeavour break the walls of national 
security-based discourse in Israeli politics? Since the issue of national security 
defines much of Israel’s identity, the conceptual “map” it sets up transforms and 
shifts the political “barometer”. The next paragraph deals with the two ways the 
term “security” was interpreted and used in the last legislative elections. 
 
 
The Two Faces of Security 
 
Electoral success in Israel has always been determined by an inevitable 
buzzword: security. This thorny theme defines what may be considered as “day-
to-day problems” as well as how and to what extent other issues must be tackled 
in relation to it. Israeli leaders have the duty to make their best to guarantee 
national security. Yet this magic word has shown a progressively different 
meaning in the last electoral campaign. Political discourse had seemed to have 
overcome the traditional issue of peace-war\national security regarding the 
                                                 
31 
 Kahlon is a former member of the Likud, former Minister of Communications (2009-
2013) as well as Minister of Welfare and Social Services (2011-2013). Two years after he 
had taken a break from politics in 2012, Moshe Kahlon founded a new political party, the 
Kulanu party (We All Together) which won 10 seats in the Knesset. 
32
  He has overtly demanded the Finance Ministry and other social-related portfolios for 
other party-members. 
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Arab-Israeli conflict (i.e. the dichotomous metaphor of hawks vs. doves) in 
terms of both ideological divider and popular consensus-builder. Following the 
abovementioned, Israeli parties’ positions mainly invested in the security issue 
identifying it with domestic affairs, namely the state of social welfare 
(especially housing), taxation and current economic unease. Hence, the hawks 
and doves lost their supremacy to the seemingly binding legalistic discourse of 
good government as a provider of equal social opportunities. However, the 
softer, domestic, yet instrumental, rhetoric of “social security” eventually died out. 
On Election Day, 17 March 2015, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
warned, on a broadcasted video on a Facebook page-event, that Israeli Arabs 
were heading to the polls “in droves33. This pivotal moment in Netanyahu’s 
personal campaign of “fear and racism”34 ended with what spin-doctors, PR, 
journalists and other communication professionals named “Bibi’s Three-Day 
War”, “Bibi’s Blitz” or Netanyahu’s “Three-Day Push”35. Not only was the 
latter a desperate politically incorrect cry for help, considering the risky position 
of the Likud according the pre-polls, it revived the “We vs. Them” dichotomy 
against the Israeli Left (a legitimate opponent to outdo), but most of all, it 
manifested the successful rising of racist demagoguery which penetrated the 
Israeli “state of mind” against the 20% Arab minority living as equal-right 
Israeli citizens. The dashing equalitarian welfare rhetoric suddenly fell from 
grace and allowed the 30-seat victory of the Likud in the elections, not to 
mention the personal triumph of Netanyahu himself over the “monopolistically 
unrepresentative leftish media”36. Furthermore, the anti-Arab statement quickly 
became an international scandal, when US President Barack Obama, during an 
interview to the American Huffington Post given on March 21st, addressed the 
matter by saying: “We indicated that that kind of rhetoric was contrary to what 
                                                 
33
  The announcement also stated that the Israeli radical Left was sponsored by foreign 
governments (i.e. Iran) attempting to put an end to Likud rule and repeated the allegations 
against the V15 (Victory 2015) campaign (financed by the international grassroots 
movement OneVoice). The Facebook video (in Hebrew) is available on 
https://www.facebook.com/268108602075/posts/10152778935532076 (last accessed 19 
June 2016). 
34
  The anti-liberal statement was largely reported and criticized by journalists and 
intellectuals with Israeli Arab TV host and journalist Lucy Aharish (a “torch-lighter” to be 
at Israel’s next Independence Day ceremony, themed “Israeli breakers”) as the main 
defender of democracy-loving Israel. 
35
  For two journalistic examples that used this kind of denomination, see the following: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/18/us-israel-election-fallout-idUSKBN0ME 1012 
0150318 (English), (last accessed 11 July 2017 ); http://www.maariv.co.il/news/elections-
2015/Article-468742 (Hebrew), (last accessed 11 July 2017).   
36
  Such accusations by the Israeli Prime Minister have only increased since the open 
criticism directed at the director-general of the Israel’s Second Authority Broadcasting 
Company Shai Babad in July 2014. The latter resigned few months later in order to run in 
the Kulanu List for the Knesset. 
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is the best of Israel’s traditions […]”37. A similar statement was consequently 
given by the deputy spokesperson for the United States Department of State 
Marie Harf on March 23rd. The fact that the Israeli electorate let the securitarian 
discourse to take over social matters and positively respond to Netanyahu’s 
statements may teach us that the two issues occupy different spots in the Israeli 
political discourse (with security vis-à-vis the Arab threat being the highest 
priority), and that they are banalised as dissimilar and contrasting components 
of the larger “Israeli state of mind”. 
Prime Minister Netanyahu formally apologized to Israeli Arabs, when 
he hosted an official delegation six days after the “misfortunate statement” at 
the Prime Minister’s Residence. On the same day (March 23), Channel 10 
evening edition journalist Oshrat Kotler interviewed the Joint List chairman 
Ayman Odeh about the reconciliation between Netanyahu and the Arab 
minority. The young and charismatic Arab leader rejected the apology asserting 
that the 90% of Israeli Arabs who voted the Joint List against Netanyahu’s 
racist stances were not invited to the Prime Minister’s Residence. Later that 
evening, Israeli President Reuven Rivlin, a longtime critic of Benjamin Netanyahu, 
announced that formal consultations on forming Israel’s new government have 
been concluded, and appointed Netanyahu as Israel’s (old-new) Prime Minister. 
This episode demonstrates the fragility of any attempt to rethink Israel’s 
security in terms of social welfare. Since the Arab conflict and the perennial 
need to secure national borders hinder any change in Israel’s budget 
prioritization, what had seemed to be a salient discourse in Israeli politics in 
favour of welfare policies did not outdo the vicious circle of “hard power” 
security discourse, cynically adopted in the name of political conservation. The 
question regarding who are the political actors taking charge of Israel’s national 
interests, and the qualities they possess to govern Israeli citizens are the core-
issues that are discussed in the next paragraph. 
 
 
Antagonistic Political Actors 
 
Personal charisma is the name of the game in Israeli contemporary 
politics. Seldom do parties succeed in gaining wide popular support without its 
leading figure continuously building up and affirming his (rarely hers) 
charismatic leadership. The personalization of politics puts the right face and 
the right rhetoric for it to express the people’s common sense. It transcends the 
technicalities of procedural democracy and parliamentary representation, and it 
                                                 
37
  A full transcript of the interview is available on http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2015/03/21/obama-huffpost-interview-transcript_n_6905450.html (last accessed 19 June 
2016). 
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configures voters in the vivid image of self-determinant rational citizenry. But 
charismatic stances also bestow responsibility upon the leader’s own shoulders 
in terms of personalized trust (rather than in terms of institutional 
accountability). Hence, the leader’s primary role is to serve as a spokesperson to 
the masses, silent or noisy majority whatsoever, for him\her to enjoy voters’ 
trust. This imperative is slightly different from the more “traditionally” 
functional norm-based definition of a “statesman”, whose major duty is to 
manage and supervise the execution and performative conduct of the state 
apparatus, while serving the national interest at best38. In order to (re)gain that 
trust (which is more or less what democracy is truly about), the leader puts 
voice in the mouths of the unprivileged, a “genuine” gesture through which the 
simple majority finds its true way. Though most politicians, nowadays, have 
become charisma-seeking individuals, there exist only fewer and fewer 
examples of political actors who have stood out and played their “theatrical” 
part of popular heroes, ready to transform words into actions39. Moreover, the 
role of “man of action” indulges people’s enthusiasm with instant solutions for 
their day-to-day problems. The moral register stirs up popular admiration vis-à-
vis the upsurge of scandals and misdeeds committed within politics, sometimes 
by the same politicians to whom the latter are attributed. The last Israeli 
election, held on March 17, is a formidable case to demonstrate these assertions. 
Incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has won the electoral 
round against all odds, or against what had seemed to be the case40, − as the 
results should have been better hypothesized by experts who embarrassingly did 
not base the opinion polls on most Israelis’ positive judgement about 
Netanyahu’s suitability to govern (43% vs. 35% of his opponent Isaac “Bougie” 
Herzog). The two candidates did not step out of the charisma-building 
campaign, but embraced it and adopted similar political strategies. Despite the 
abyss concerning the starting point of the two, both ideologically and 
personally, their electoral “squabble” represented no novelty to Israeli politics. 
Ideology was seldom discussed and confronted, since it had been practically 
                                                 
38
  The “ideal-type” distinction between a “political leader” and a “statesperson” is debatable. 
These categorial limits get somewhat blurred by history and nostalgia because many past 
public (political) figures are viewed today as the “Generation of Nephilim” (e.g. 
David Ben-Gurion, Chaim Weizmann, Ze’ev Jabotinsky, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak 
Rabin etc.). 
39
  Here comes to mind the thriving and vast literature on Max Weber’s “Politics as 
Profession”. Furthermore, the critical aspect of democratic politics as the rule of law and 
functional administration reemerges. 
40
  The last opinion polls published four days before the Election Day outlined a four-seat 
advantage to the centre-left  political alliance the Zionist Union (Hebrew: HaMahane 
HaZioni): 24 vs. 20 seats going to the Likud. The data is taken from an opinion poll 
published by Channel 10 (March 13th 2015; the poll consisted of 1203 adults (including 
258 Israeli Arabs).   
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blurred by the usual banalisation of domestic issues (mainly welfare) and 
security imperatives (Iran). The same old litany about why the governing 
candidate would be much worse than his opponent did not bring on a political 
shift. Furthermore, key-words such as “true leadership”, “responsibility”, 
“accountability” (the candidates’ personal virtues), “national pride” and 
“security” (goals to be achieved) were much to be expected as in each and every 
campaign. However, the narratives that contain them vary according to the 
“zeitgeist” of the moment. Thus the last Israeli elections give us the opportunity 
to identify personal charisma as one of the current ingredients contributing to 
the formation of the Israeli “state of mind”.  
The two candidates were much identified by their personal biographies. 
This is not uncommon in politics but here the match was to the nth degree. Both 
politicians hold “by-the-book” pedigrees. The histories of these two prominent 
Zionist lineages were engaged in the electoral campaign attesting that public 
service is inseparable from both the Netanyahu and the Herzog families. Likud 
campaign videos did not hesitate to remind voters that Benjamin Netanyahu 
grew up in a Zionist home, followed his older brother’s footsteps in the IDF, 
and served as Israeli ambassador to the UN (1984-1988)41. A parallel 
biographical excursus was also offered by Isaac Herzog in campaign of the 
Zionist Union. Therefore Jewish tradition, active Zionism, rich military 
experience and diplomatic skills were to determine the candidate’s suitability to 
govern, as if such qualities passed down from generation to generation. Giving 
these biographical pedigrees, the two contenders could not escape the 
personalization of the position they were so eager to occupy. Their antagonism was 
chiefly marked by mutual accusations of recklessness and ineptitude vis-à-vis 
social and economic reforms and the precarious geopolitical situation. Although 
a thorough comparison between Netanyahu’s and Herzog’s biographies would 
be a legitimate way to assess their political aptitude, what really 
interested\influenced the Israeli electorate was a bit different. That is to say the 
elections had a less “gossip-centered” nuance to them. 
Fear of change and progress makes the magic notion of the people an 
extraordinary tool (as well as a project) in the hands of two political ideas: one 
is based on rational norms of democratic citizenship, the other on sentimental 
                                                 
41
  As the electoral campaign was warming up Netanyahu’s decision to address the US 
Congress on March 3rd, 2015 and declare opposition to the “Iranian Nuclear Deal” 
became a new example for his statesman-qualities. Some American politicians and media 
personalities (identified with the Republican Party, e.g.: Speaker of the United States 
House of Representatives John Boehner; House Representative Jason Chaffetz; TV and 
radio broadcaster Rush Limbaugh) compared Netanyahu’s speech to the one delivered by 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who “similarly” opposed the Munich 
Agreement (1938). The comparison was mainly based on the fact the two political figures 
were the only foreign leaders to address the US Congress in three different occasions. The 
analogy provoked open debates, both in the USA and Israel. 
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kinship. What may be called “populism”, or the project of the people, is based 
upon the dialectics of integration and separation of the entire community of the 
heartland42. The union of these two evocative concepts (“people”+ “heartland”) 
places the first to be “the occupants” of the second; an orderly and harmonious 
“territory of the imagination”43. versus external others. Hence, this reciprocal 
exclusion of the concepts identity and alterity44 manifests negative terms of 
conduct and dangerous political behaviour. In Israel the fragile condition of the 
evidently ethnicity\culture-based socio-political fabric makes it easier for 
populist stances to strengthen their hold, and democracy an easy prey. 
Contemporaneously with legalistically-bound discourse and personal charisma, 
political preference in Israel also re-emerges in terms of “sectorial voting”. As 
such it is based on the cleavages of ethnicity (embedded in both culture and 
politics), especially since social cohesion and economic welfare seem to be at 
stake. In addition, the explosiveness of Israeli hyper-litigiousness, − even 
reflected in the humorous popular saying: “two Jews, three opinions” −, showed 
its features in the last electoral campaign, mainly through sociological 
categories (i.e. Ashkenazi\Sephardic, religious\lay, centre\periphery, Left\Right, 
Jews\non-Jews). That is to say that the antagonistic ethnic variation within the 
“Israeli people”, and where charisma surely plays a significant part ‒, 
determines many aspects of the country’s political “state of mind”. 
A “sectorial” (heavily personalized) antagonism was evident in the 
turbulent struggle for votes between Shas and Yachad (lit. “Together”). Shas, 
led by Aryeh Mahlouf Deri (chairman of Shas throughout the 1990s, former 
Minister of the Interior, convicted of bribery in 2000), had to face its former 
chairman for almost 14 years, Eli Yishai, founder of Yachad. Yishai (once aide 
to Deri himself) left Shas after the clash of egos, following the death of Rabbi 
Ovadia Yosef in 2013. Since the tutelage and legacy of the late Rabbi, Shas’s 
spiritual leader, had generated disputes and intrigues between the two 
politicians, both convinced to be the former’s favourite and thus his legitimate 
political heir, a crack within the Sephardic ultraorthodox electorate was 
inevitable. Deri succeeded in “saving” the party from failure45 as he had used a 
catchy buzzword to accompany his “Mizrahi vote for Mizrahi!” campaign: 
“invisible”. Whereas Moshe Kahlon addressed (somewhat indirectly) to lay 
Sephardi Israelis, belonging to the middle-class, and Eli Yishai centred his 
(failing) campaign on the struggle against those “who put at risk the Jewishness 
                                                 
42
  The locution “heartland people” is adopted from Paul Taggart, Populism, Open University 
Press, Buckingham, 2000. 
43
  See Paul Taggart, Populism, cit., p. 95.  
44
  Taken from F. Remotti, L’ossessione identitaria, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2010, see p. 6 (my 
translation). 
45
  Shas won 7 seats in the new Knesset; a sharp decrease in political power, if compared 
with the 11 MKs (members of Knesset) it had in the 19th Knesset.   
Engraving Politics 325 
 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVII  no. 2  2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of the State” (e.g. clandestine immigrants in downtown Tel-Aviv)46, Derhi 
approached those who hadn’t just been forgotten by the establishment, but had 
never achieved real social, economic or political equality within Israeli society. 
Thus, Shas chairman waved the flag of the “nobody people” still working for 
their elitist usurpers; surely represented by both the Zionist Union and Likud, 
but above all by Yesh Atid and its leader Yair Lapid whose father Yosef “Tommy” 
Lapid47 was also a vocal opponent of Shas and other ultra-orthodox parties48. 
A different “heartland people”49 were glorified by the Jewish Home 
charismatic leader Naftali Bennett (Netanyahu’s Minister of Economy) who 
adopted an adamant slogan: “We stop apologizing, Israel’s Right”. His national-
religious “people” initially seemed to resist in front of the Right-Left 
dichotomy. Moreover, he occupied the political void on the Right of the Likud, 
in crisis vis-à-vis Kulanu. However, Netanyahu’s alarmism soon “cannibalized” 
the Jewish Home extreme-Right electorate, since the Israeli Prime Minister 
shouted louder “rescues” and “save the Likud!” in his “three-day war”. The 
turning point of the loss of the Jewish Home’s political autonomy became 
evident at the 20,000 people national\religious Right manifestation in Tel-Aviv 
on March 15th, where Benjamin Netanyahu stole the show from Bennett as the 
central speaker. Even though the Jewish Home was unable to preserve its 
electoral power (it won only 8 seats in the new-elected Knesset), Naftali 
Bennett would remain a central figure in any coalition Netanyahu chose to 
form. This is determined by the increasing convergence of the messianic-
nationalistic vision of “Greater Israel” and its sliding towards a more central 
position in the Israeli “state of mind”.  
A more drastic electoral result was the almost-at-risk, wobbly, situation 
of Avigdor Lieberman’s party Yisrael Beitenu. Pre-polls showed a rapid 
decrease in the party’s attraction. Some estimates predicted a political decline of 
more than 50% in Knesset seats (4-5 seats out of the existing 11, or even a 
hypothetical disappearance). However, Yisrael Beitenu won 6 seats, hence, 
capable of determining future political developments. The almost 50% decrease 
in votes was largely due to dissatisfaction and delusion, much felt by the party’s 
traditional electorate. Suspicions about large-scale corruption (i.e. bribery and 
forgery) in the party’s ranks rose sharply, and police investigations were soon 
reported by Israeli media. Around 30 persons linked to Yisrael Beitenu were 
                                                 
46
  Yachad failed to cross the electoral threshold (it received 2.97% of the vote) and did not 
enter the new Knesset. 
47
  Yosef Lapid (1931-2008) was a writer, journalist and politician who headed the secular-
liberal party Shinui (lit. “Change”) from 1999 to 2006.   
48
  It is noteworthy to mention that the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox party Yahadut HaTora 
HaMeuhedet (lit. “United Torah Judaism”) gained 6 seats in the 20th Knesset, after it had 
adopted a “non-sectorial” electoral campaign, basing it on social welfare and healthcare. 
49
  See notes 43-44 
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investigated, including: lobbyists, local and regional representatives, CEOs of 
state-owned enterprises, heads of voluntary associations and members of 
Knesset. Furthermore, the often called “Extreme Right populist party50 was 
unable to mobilize the once loyal “Russian voice”. The unsuccessful political 
alliance with the Likud (dissolved in July 2014 after less than two years) left 
signs of panic and uncertainty. The extremely violent rhetoric endorsing the 
legislation of death penalty for Arab terrorists was too much desperate for the 
electorate to follow Lieberman’s shabby charisma. The non-sectorial vote is a 
real novelty (the party’s campaign itself lacked any videos or written messages 
in Russian). Thus, we may argue that the once self-referential, “ghettoed”, 
Russian-speaking community in Israel has found its place in more general-led 
politics. In this regard, some might consider the shift in favour of the Likud to 
be a re-centralisation process of Israeli Rightists. However, as said about 
Netanyahu’s “three day war”, it is more likely to assume that the fear of 
handing power to the Left was the factor which most influenced the Right-wing 
electorate to concentrate, rather than centralize, its vote. 
Equally interesting is the centralisation-trend, though minor in scale, 
which implied changes in the inner-positioning of the Israeli Left; where social-
democratic Zionist Meretz almost risked not passing the legal threshold because 
of the failing attempt to sign a surplus-vote agreement with the Joint List (which 
it had previously signed with the Zionist Union). In addition, the almost-fatal 
electoral position was largely due to the “cannibalisation” of votes by both the 
Zionist Union and Yesh Atid, as the electorate of reference is roughly 
overlapping (i.e. in the case of social-democratic Ashkenazi youth from Israel’s 
economic centre: the so-called “state of Tel-Aviv”). Nevertheless, after a nerve-
racking electoral campaign and the promise to resign, ‒ if Meretz disappeared 
from the new Knesset ‒, the party’s leader Zehava Gal-On, claiming Meretz’s 
place as Israel’s true “Left” by the call: “We Cannot Lose Meretz; It’s Up To 
You”, did succeed in re-gaining the party’s position in the Knesset (5 seats, only 
one seat less than the 6 it had won in the 2013 elections). Hence, the wish to 
create a less multi-polarized political system, by changing the electoral 
threshold, only partially achieved its goal, since it did not cause the vanishing of 
the more ideological poles in Israeli politics (at least in the short run). 
 Rather different is the electoral fortune of the Joint List. Since the 
a-Zionist Arab political conglomerate was the direct result of the new legal 
threshold, the inner disputes within the Arab leadership had to be placated (at 
least in appearance). The latter’s campaign (videos broadcasted in Arabic 
followed by Hebrew subtitles) envisaged Israel as an open-minded democracy 
enjoying high-tech industrial prosperity; but did not miss the opportunity to 
recall the expropriation of lands by Jewish hands in order to claim political 
                                                 
50
  D. Filc, U. Lebel, “The Post-Oslo Israeli Populist Radical Right...cit.”. 
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justice. However, what had been promoted as an anti-racism alliance vs. 
Netanyahu’s anti-Arab policies did not lead to a major shift in Israeli minorities’ 
political preference (here we include the approximate two mandate power in the 
hand of Israeli Druze51). Although the Israeli Arab voice gained political 
momentum and large media coverage throughout the campaign, the 13 seats 
(446,583 votes) the Joint List now holds in the Israeli Parliament is by no means 
“explosive”. It does not erode the hegemonic stability of the Jewish-centred 
party system. Moreover, it is unlikely the Joint List takes an active part in any 
nascent opposition, considering the traditional “refusal” to cooperate with any 
“Zionist agenda”. Hence, the impressive result of the new-born sectorial party 
does not suggest a radical turning-point in political participation on the Israeli 
Arab street. The electoral achievement simply reflects the more gradual 
demographic change52, while uniting the usually divided Arab voice under the 
same political roof. 
The political enterprise of the Zionist Union, founded on December 10th 
2014, may be summarized in the total lack of political finesse. Though the 
alliance between HaAvoda (the Israeli Labour Party) and Hatnuah (lit. “The 
Movement”)53 was supposedly built on pragmatic shrewdness, ‒ aiming to unite 
liberal Zionist peace-seeking voters around a competitive political power ‒, the 
centre-Left electorate viewed it as a mishmash of old-style opportunism (since 
Livni took part of Netanyahu’s previous government) and a mere technical 
operation (in order to attract centre swing voters vis-à-vis Yesh Atid54) with no 
real ideological renewal55. The rather uncharismatic personalities of Isaac 
Herzog and Tzipi Livni and their technical discourses did not succeed in 
offering an appealing alternative to Netanyahu’s rightist hegemony. Livni’s 
choice to step back from the premiership-on-rotation clause (if the latter 
presented a hurdle to form a new government) 24 hours before the opening of 
the ballot box, only pointed out the survival despair of the two leaders and 
revealed their indecisiveness. In addition to the “one step forward, two steps 
                                                 
51
  In the new-elected Knesset this minority is represented by three MPs: Dr. Abdullah Abu 
Ma’aruf (placed 13th in the Joint List), Ayoob Kara (26th in the Likud List), and Hamad Amar 
(5th placed in Yisrael Beitenu). 
52
  In the 19th Knesset the Arab electorate joined 11 seats which were divided as follows: 
4 Ra’am-Ta’al+3 Balad+4 Hadash (including the Jewish Member of Knesset Dov Khenin). 
53
  The party was founded in 2012 by Tzipi Livni (who left Kadima) seeking to form a more 
liberal centre in Israeli politics. 
54
  Though Yesh Atid was viewed as an electoral threat able to “steal” centrist votes from the 
ones Hatnuah was claiming to bring to the Zionist Union, it did not succeed in 
maintaining electoral support and won only 11 seats in the new Knesset (a sharp decline 
from the 19 it had won in 2013). 
55
  The agreement to form the “Zionist Union” was followed by a wave of resignations of 
figureheads from Hatnua: former Major General Elazar Stern joined Yesh Atid, whereas 
Meir Sheetrit, Amram Mitzna and David Tzur retired from politics altogether.  
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back” campaign, while Herzog was trying to place himself as a responsible 
leader (slogan: “Responsibility, the foundation for leadership”), and Tzipi Livni 
seemed absent, the Zionist Union’s campaign took a serious blow. On March 
7th, a mass Left-wing rally (circa 60-80,000 people) took place in Rabin Square 
in Tel-Aviv. Its initiators called “Israel Wants Change”, thus endorsing 
pro-Zionist Union stances. The main speaker was former Director of Mossad 
Meri Dagan who overtly criticized Netanyahu’s policies. Nonetheless, the 
fervent support did not put out the provocative flames kindled by the opening 
speech, delivered by artist Yair Garbuz. The latter called for an all-citizens 
Israeli democracy, that Mizrahi Israelis (the Sephardi), other religious people, 
and Right-voters were primitive, ignorant, corrupted and extremist; a menace to 
democracy. The speech generated a wide range of political reactions. But the 
accusations of elitism and racism were not appeased, since the Ashkenazi elitist 
couple Herzog and Livni were soon identified with Garbuz’s views. Political 
miscalculations, lack of charisma and “on-the-paper” popularity impeded the 
creation of wide and solid electoral support; placing the Zionist Union second 
largest among Israeli parties (with 24 seats). 
 
 
Conclusions:  
A Tricky Political “State of Mind”? 
 
Following the scope conditions the article laid out, it seems the last 
legislative elections, held on March 17th 2015, did not modify the political 
“self” of Israel. The perception of “security” in geopolitical terms rapidly 
liquidated the demands for welfare security originated in the social justice 
protests of 2011. National security is still a predominant issue buzzing and 
echoing throughout the Israeli vote. Fear from the “other” (i.e. the “Arabs”; 
perceived as internal and external threat alike) still dictates the priorities in 
Israelis’ own political mind-sets. 
Furthermore, the waves of legalistic discourse concerning consolidated 
norms and practices have declined vis-à-vis the increasing drift towards the 
personalisation of party politics and the charisma-built suitability to govern a 
complicated society. Both features confirm the presence and use of 
demagoguery as well as what may be categorized as neo-populism. In other 
words, political leaderships adopt and adapt old commonplaces and slogans to 
gain electoral consensus rather than to provide alternatives to the fragile socio-
cultural status quo which makes Israel a laboratory of political tensions. These 
trends place Israel in the “uncomfortable” zone with other mature western 
democracies. The indicator to this is the almost gossip-like tones accompanying 
the campaign which emphasized neither the role the two candidates aspired to, 
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nor the parties as political alternatives. This was also evident in the form of 
various antagonisms concerning identity-based issues such as ethnicity, religion 
and socio-economic background. The institutional reform of the Knesset’s legal 
threshold seems to have been a minor factor in determining the balance of party 
representation, as the Israeli Parliament still remains multipolar and fragmented. 
In addition, the structural move did not placate the agitating waters of Israel’s 
“sectorial” voting preferences, where inner\outer contentious dynamics involved 
some key-politicians (i.e. Moshe Kahlon but mainly the Yishai-Deri rupture) 
while demonstrating a highly antagonistic competition between leaders, 
sometimes even regardless of ideological stances. Nonetheless, it did generate 
more or less inclusive alliances between some existing parties (namely the cases 
of the Joint List and the Zionist Union). Despite these political shifts and 
intrigues, the electoral results manifest the weight and fragility of Israeli socio-
cultural fabric as determinants of what may seem as socio-political conservatism. 
In more general terms, the paper has tackled the concept of “state of 
mind” which has not yet been used to contextualize singular political events 
(such as elections). Matching the latter with more common conceptual 
frameworks (e.g. identity, discourse, and even ideology) may contribute to 
bridge the gaps between long-rage political trajectory and more punctual events 
without renouncing the multi-factorial and processual analyses. The adaptation 
of the traditional use of “state of mind”, focused on perceptions and values, to 
the sociopolitical analysis of elections further solidifies the connection between 
political culture and political practices. 
 
 
